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Abstract
In an environment with correlated returns, this paper characterizes optimal lend-
ing contracts when the bank faces adverse selection and borrowers have limited
liability. Group lending contracts are shown to be dominated by revelation mech-
anisms which do not use the ex post observability of the partners' performances.
However, when collusion between borrowers under complete information is allowed,
group lending contracts are optimal in the class of simple revelation mechanisms
(which elicit only the borrower's own private information) and remain useful with
extended revelation mechanisms.
JEL Classication: D8, G2, O12, O17.
Keywords: Group lending, adverse selection, collusion, development.
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1 Introduction
The development of group lending through the Grameen Bank and similar institutions has
attracted the interest of all those who believe that lending to the poor is a necessary step
to exit the vicious circles of underdevelopment. The empirical evaluation of the success
of these new ways of lending to entrepreneurs who have no collateral is still subject to
debates (see Khandker, Khalily and Khan (1995), Morduch (1997), Pitt and Khandker
(1996)).
Theorists have proposed various explanations for the new opportunities provided by
group lending (see Ghatak and Guinnane (1998) for a review). In this paper we restrict
our attention to group lending as an instrument to improve discrimination between en-
trepreneurs of dierent types (adverse selection).
Ghatak (2000) and Armendariz and Gollier (2000) have argued that group lending
triggers a peer selection eect among entrepreneurs who know each other. For independent
types, they show how the knowledge of the types in the group which vary with the dierent
regroupings (for example in a group of two: two good types or two bad types or one good
and one bad type) makes discrimination possible. When entrepreneurs do not know
each other, with independent types, group lending brings no improvement (Laont and
N'Guessan (1999)).
In this paper we propose a simple model to study the role of group lending in discrim-
ination when collusion between borrowers is possible.
We consider exogenously xed potential pairs of entrepreneurs who carry projects
with correlated returns. Each entrepreneur, when he discovers his type, revises his beliefs
about the type of his partner. Nevertheless he does not observe his partner's type. When
correlation becomes perfect we have the situation where agents know each other.
We leave aside the issue of endogenous regrouping to focus on two questions: rst, what
is the relative power of group lending of the Grameen Bank type (called GB contracts),
where a successful entrepreneur must contribute to the repayment of his partner if the
project of this latter fails, in the class of all possible lending mechanisms? Second, what
are the optimal collusion-proof lending contracts and how do the GB contracts perform
from the point of view of collusion?
3
The model with correlated types is presented in Section 2. Optimal individual lending
contracts are characterized in Section 3. The optimal pairing mechanisms which are
individually incentive compatible are obtained in Section 4. The place of Grameen Bank
(GB) contracts in the class of individually incentive compatible mechanisms is explained
in Section 5. Section 6 shows that the GB contracts are in fact optimal when a certain type
of group incentive constraints are taken into account. Section 7 considers more general
revelation mechanisms and shows that GB contracts remain useful in this context. Section
8 concludes.
2 The Model
There is a continuum of pairs of entrepreneurs, each entrepreneur being associated with
a good or a bad project. A good (resp. bad) project returns h when it is successful, i.e.,
with probability p (resp. p with p > p), for one unit of investment. For simplicity we
consider only projects of size one.
A pair of entrepreneurs represents a local set of investment opportunities. For sim-
plicity again, we take the case of a group of two entrepreneurs, but, at the cost of more
complex notation, it could be a group of any size. However, the size of the group is here
exogenous, and we do not raise the issue of the optimal number of entrepreneurs in a
group.
Let pi 2 fp; pg be the type of entrepreneur i's project, or, for brevity, the type of
the entrepreneur. The types in a pair, (p1; p2), are jointly distributed according to the
distribution function
11 = Pr(p1 = p and p2 = p)
12 = Pr(p1 = p and p2 = p) = 21 = Pr(p1 = p and p2 = p)
22 = Pr(p1 = p and p2 = p):
Let  = 1122   1221 > 0, a measure of the correlation of types.
Entrepreneurs are risk neutral3 and have no wealth. They must borrow to invest and
they can only reimburse their loan if their project is successful.
3To assume risk neutrality may appear inappropriate in this context. However, the assumption of
limited liability at zero wealth will play a role similar to risk aversion given that there is no ex post moral
hazard dimension in the entrepreneurs' activity.
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The lender is a monopolistic bank which has a cost of funds r and which maximizes
expected prot. We assume that under complete information all loans are socially valuable
because the expected prot from a bad type project is greater than the entrepreneur's
opportunity cost ph  r  u > 0, when u is the status quo utility level of an entrepreneur
outside the relationship with the bank. Eciency calls for all projects to be nanced.
3 Individual Contracts
The bank designs individual contracts. An entrepreneur randomly chosen has a probabil-
ity  = 11 + 12 (resp.  = 21 + 22) of being of type p (resp. p). From the revelation
principle we know that, in order to characterize optimal individual contracts, there is no
restriction in considering pairs of contracts
(P ; x); ( P ; x)
which specify for each type a probability of receiving a loan and a payment if the project
is successful. These contracts must satisfy incentive constraints which write:4
Pp(h  x)  Pp(h  x) (1)
P p(h  x)  P p(h  x): (2)
Participation constraints are:
Pp(h  x)  u (3)
P p(h  x)  u: (4)
The bank maximizes its expected prot
P (px  r) + (1  ) P (px  r); (5)
subject to (1), (2), (3), (4).
The bank has two possible strategies. Either to oer contracts which are accepted by
both types of entrepreneurs (Regime 1), or to oer a contract which is only accepted by
a good type (Regime 2). We obtain immediately (see Appendix 1):
4For simplicity we assume that borrowers loose their outside opportunity u when they apply for the
loan. We obtain similar results if we dene utility, say for type p, as Pp(h  x) + (1   P )u.
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Proposition 1 If




Regime 1 holds. The bank oers a pooling contract which gives a loan to all entrepreneurs
for a reimbursement x = h  u
p
when the project is successful.
If




Regime 2 holds. The bank oers a contract accepted only by type p entrepreneurs with a
reimbursement x = h  u
p
when the project is successful.













Regime 1 is preferred by the bank if the expected prot to be realized with type p







that must be given up in Regime 1 to type p (in contrast to Regime 2 where no rent need
to be given to these entrepreneurs), because of the presence of type p.
In Regime 1 the allocation of loans is ecient, and the good type entrepreneurs are
able to obtain a rent despite the monopolistic structure of banking. In Regime 2 the
allocation of loans is inecient since the valuable projects of type p are not nanced, but
the good type entrepreneurs obtain no rent.
4 Pairing Contracts
The bank considers now the natural groups of entrepreneurs which are the pairs of en-
trepreneurs with correlated projects and exploits the fact that the structure of correlation
is common knowledge. For notational convenience let us refer to type p (resp. p) as type
1 (resp. 2). From the revelation principle again, there is no loss of generality in restricting
the oer of contracts to two four-uples, (x11; x12; x21; x22), (y11; y12; y21; y22), where xij is
the repayment of an entrepreneur who has announced that he is of type i when his partner
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has announced that he is of type j, and when both have succeeded; similarly yij is the
repayment of a successful entrepreneur when his partner has not succeeded, and with the
same announcements.5
The participation and incentive constraints of type p and p are respectively (see Ap-
pendix 2):
11(h  px11   (1   p)y11) + 12(h  px12   (1   p)y12) 
u
p
(11 + 12) (6)
21(h  px21   (1   p)y21) + 22(h  px22   (1   p)y22) 
u
p
(21 + 22) (7)
11(h  px11   (1   p)y11) + 12(h  px12   (1  p)y12)
 11(h  px21   (1  p)y21) + 12(h  px22   (1  p)y22) (8)
21(h  px21   (1   p)y21) + 22(h  px22   (1  p)y22)
 21(h   px11   (1  p)y11) + 22(h  px12   (1   p)y12): (9)
Furthermore, we have the wealth constraints:
xij  h ; yij  h for all i; j: (10)
The bank's expected prots are, for a pair of entrepreneurs:
11[2p
2x11 + 2p(1   p)y11] + 212[pp(x12 + x21) + p(1   p)y12 + (1   p)py21]
+22[2p
2x22 + 2p(1  p)y21]  2r:
The average prot for the continuum of entrepreneurs is:
11p[px11 + (1  p)y11) + 12[p(px12 + (1   p)y12) + p(px21 + (1  p)y21)]
5We assume that all entrepreneurs of a given type receive or do not receive a loan. This can be proved
as in Section 3. We will also focus without loss of generality on symmetric solutions.
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+22p[px22 + (1   p)y22)]  r: (11)
We note that, both in the objective function of the bank and in the constraints, the
entrepreneurs' payments enter only through the expected terms X11 = px11 + (1  p)y11,
X12 = px12 + (1   p)y12, X21 = px21 + (1   p)y21, X22 = px22 + (1   p)y22. The wealth




i; j = 1; 2
11pX11 + 12(pX12 + pX21) + 22pX22   r
s.t.
11(h X11) + 12(h X12) 
u
p
(11 + 12) (12)
21(h X21) + 22(h X22) 
u
p
(21 + 22) (13)
11(h X11) + 12(h X12)  11(h X21) + 12(h X22) (14)
21(h X21) + 22(h X22)  21(h X11) + 22(h X12) (15)
Xij  h for all i; j: (16)
We rst show that, if the correlation of types is high enough, the optimal pairing
contracts are ecient and leave no rent to entrepreneurs.
Proposition 2 When the correlation is high enough (p12 small enough) the optimal con-
tracts of the bank are ecient.
Proof: See Appendix 3.
The logic here is the one of Crémer-McLean (1988). Using the correlation of types,
the bank can design rewards and penalties which both induce truthful revelation of types
by entrepreneurs and saturate participation constraints. Here, we nd X11 = X21 <
X21 = X22, i.e., the payment of an entrepreneur is independent of his own type and
greater when he is paired with a good type. We do not need to condition contracts
on the production level of the partner, but only on announcements (and on the agent's
production level because of limited wealth). We will call these contracts unconditional
revelation contracts. Diculties may arise from wealth constraints, but this does not
occur for a correlation of types high enough.
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To explore the eects of binding wealth constraints we consider a special case of
correlation which can be characterized by a single number:
11 = 22 =
1
2




Then, Proposition 2 holds always if the wealth constraints are not binding, i.e. if (see
Appendix 3):




Proposition 3 In the special case, the wealth constraint becomes binding for " > ".
Then the solution is
X12 = X22 = h




















The bank prefers to oer only a contract to the good type with no rent if
(ph  r   u) < R:






Comparing with the case of individual contracts, we see that lending to both types (i.e.,
ecient lending) occurs more often now.
When the correlation is high, it is possible by using two payments (one when the
partner announces he is good, one when he announces he his bad) to discriminate between
types and extract all the information rents. This is achieved despite the pooling nature
of the optimal contract.
When the correlation of types is small, the bank asks the successful entrepreneur to
pay his whole gain h when his partner is bad and must give up a rent to the good type
because it is not possible to exploit suciently the correlation of types. It shows one
limit of yardstick competition6 especially in developing countries where limited liability
constraints are particularly severe.
6See Shleifer (1985), Auriol and Laont (1992).
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5 Grameen Bank Contracts
Group lending has been institutionalized by the Grameen Bank in a particular way. The
purpose of this section is to put in perspective these contracts with respect to the optimal
contracts characterized in Section 4.
A G.B. contract is characterized, for any entrepreneur, by two possible payments when
he is successful: X if his partner is also successful and Y if his partner is not successful.
Participation constraints write:
11p[p(h X) + (1  p)(h   Y )] + 12p[p(h X) + (1  p)(h  Y )]  u(11 + 12)
(17)
21p[p(h X) + (1  p)(h  Y )] + 22p[p(h X) + (1   p)(h  Y )]  u(21 + 22):
(18)
Using the notations of Section 4 we observe that:
X11 = X21 = pX + (1  p)Y (19)
X12 = X22 = pX + (1  p)Y: (20)
Let X = X11 = X21 and X = X12 = X22 the payments in the optimal pairing
contracts of Section 4. From (19), (20), we can implement those payments with
X =
(1   p) X   (1   p)X
p  p
Y =
pX   p X
p   p
:
It remains to see when the limited liability constraints become binding. In the example
11 = 21 =
1
2
  ", 12 = 21 = ", Y is always less than h and




























(1   p) + 2"(p   p)
with a rent for the good type.7
Proposition 4 The optimal Grameen Bank contracts are ecient if correlation is high
enough but are not always optimal.
A striking feature is that contrary to the practice of Grameen Banks the payments
required from a successful entrepreneur are higher when his partner is successful than when
he fails.8 This is because we have assumed a positive correlation of types. Payments must
dier to use the correlation for rent extraction. The positive correlation implies that it is
better to extract more in more likely events. To rationalize in our context with adverse
selection the practice of Grameen Bank's contracts for which an additional payment is
required when a partner fails we need to assume negative correlation of types.9
One could of course oer a menu of Grameen Bank's contracts as in Section 4 to
induce entrepreneurs to self-select themselves. However, we saw that it is then useless to
vary payments with the success or failure of the partner. It is enough to have them vary
with the announcement of type.
Next, we take into account the possibility of collusive behavior.
6 Collusion under Complete Information
Let us rst assume that entrepreneurs may collude when they play the revelation mecha-
nism oered by the bank but after having accepted the oer of the bank. Accordingly, the
participation constraints remain the interim individual participation constraints. Further-
more, we assume that entrepreneurs always share their private information after having
7Of course, loans to only good types occur in similar circumstances as in Section 2.
8Note that this feature creates an incentive for an entrepreneur to make his partner's project unsuc-
cessful.
9From a technical point of view Grameen Bank contracts use an additional ex post signal correlated
with the type of the agent, namely the success or failure of the partner. As in Riordan and Sappington
(1988) only limited liability prevents the principal to extract all the agent's surplus.
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accepted the bank's contract, and that a ringmaster organizes the collusion. More pre-





Bank Entrepreneurs Entrepreneurs An uninformed G  S
oers accept or share ringmaster is
mechanism reject information oers a played
G G collusion
contract S
Because entrepreneurs share information, individual incentive constraints are domi-
nant strategy incentive constraints
h  px11   (1  p)y11  h  px21   (1  p)y21 (21)
h  px12   (1  p)y12  h  px22   (1  p)y22 (22)
h  px21   (1  p)y21  h  px11   (1  p)y11 (23)
h  px22   (1  p)y22  h  px12   (1  p)y12: (24)
When internal transfers are available within the coalition, collusion-proof constraints
simplify to, for a pair (1,1):
2(h  px11   (1  p)y11)
 2h  pxij   (1   p)yij   pxji   (1   p)yji for all i; j; (25)
for a pair (1,2):
p(h  px12   (1  p)y12) + p(h  px21   (1  p)y21) 
p(h   pxij   (1  p)yij) + p(h  pxji   (1   p)yji) for all i; j; (26)
for a pair (2,2):
2(h  px22   (1  p)y22)
10We are not taking into account the nancial constraints in the collusive side-contracts proposed by
the ringmaster. This exaggerates the threat of collusion, but it is of no relevance for the results we
present below. Furthermore, it can be justied if investors have hidden wealth they can use in their
side-contracting.
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 2h  pxij   (1   p)yij   pxji   (1   p)yji for all i; j: (27)
If we proceed as in Section 4 and do not distinguish payments according to the success
or failure of the partner, i.e., Xij = xij = yij for all i; j, incentive constraints imply
X11 = X21 = X22 = X12:
We are then back immediately to the individual contracts of Section 2.
Suppose on the contrary that we keep the exibility of xij 6= yij .
Dominant strategy incentive constraints imply
px11 + (1   p)y11 = px21 + (1   p)y21 (28)
px22 + (1   p)y22 = px12 + (1   p)y12; (29)
and the collusion-proof constraints reduce to
px11 + (1  p)y11  px12 + (1  p)y12 (30)
px22 + (1  p)y22  px21 + (1  p)y21 (31)
px21 + (1  p)y21  px22 + (1  p)y22 (32)
px12 + (1  p)y12  px11 + (1  p)y11; (33)
with the wealth constraints:
xij  h for all i; j
yij  h for all i; j:
With the interim participation constraints and the incentive constraints we have eight
constraints and also eight variables. Furthermore, we have the wealth constraints.
Imposing
x11 = x12 = x21 = x22 = X
y11 = y12 = y21 = y22 = Y
enables us to satisfy all individual and coalition incentive constraints, and also to extract





















The determinant of this system is (p  p) which is non null as soon as there is some
correlation. We can nd X and Y which solve the system.
In the case 11 = 22 =
1
2


























We obtain (for p+ p > 1):
Proposition 5 The optimal collusion-proof contract is the optimal Grameen Bank con-
tract if correlation is high enough.11
Note that the optimal collusion-proof contract is not here what would result from the
optimal contract of Section 4 with collusion. Indeed, then they would always claim that
they are both bad types (since from Appendix 3 we notice that X12 = X22 > X11 = X21).
They would always pay X11 and therefore the pair of good types would have a rent
contrary to what is achieved in the Grameen bank contract for a high correlation.
Grameen Bank contracts have been presented in the literature (Ghatak (2000), Ar-
mendariz and Gollier (2000)) as useful to allow some discrimination between types. We
have shown that their value for discrimination is limited and that, for this purpose, they
are dominated by contracts which vary payments as a function of the agent's announce-
ments. However, these latter contracts are not collusion-proof if agents can collude when
they play the announcement game. On the contrary, the GB contracts are robust to this
type of collusion while still allowing some discrimination. This is achieved by exploiting
the correlation of types in the uncertainty on nal production.
11In the limit for " = 0 it seems it is as if the bank was facing a single agent. This is true for
incentive constraints, but we still have two participation constraints that the bank can saturate because,
by observing the success or failure of both projects, it still has two degrees of freedom.
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7 Extended Mechanisms
We assume now that the mechanism asks from agents the whole vector of types once they
have shared their information. Any deviation from the sending of the same messages by
the two agents is punished. We are left with the collusion-proof constraints as incentive
constraints.
Suppose one does not distinguish payments according to the success or failure of the
partner. We call these mechanisms unconditional extended revelation mechanisms. These
constraints reduce to





 X11 = X22:
Proposition 6 Unconditional extended revelation mechanisms cannot be collusion-proof
and ecient.
See Appendix 4 for the proof. The intuition of this result is that, for a coalition, we
have three types (pp; pp; pp) and three revelant incentive constraints at least, and also a
participation constraint for each agent, hence ve constraints, and only four degrees of
freedom.
The added exibility of unconditional extended revelation mechanisms is not enough
to achieve eciency, while simple Gramen Bank contract do achieve eciency when the
correlation is high enough. (Proposition 4 remains valid with collusion when extended
mechanisms are used.) Using Grameen Bank extended mechanisms will increase the range
of parameters for which eciency is achieved. We can safely conclude that Grameen Bank
contracts remain useful to deal with collusion in this extended framework.
We have assumed so far that agents share information with or without collusion. The
bank knows that agents will discover the characteristics of both agents and can use ex-
tended mechanisms. If instead, the third party only has the technology for sharing infor-
mation, in a mechanismwhich does not elicit the fact that agents collude, the bank cannot
use extended mechanisms and we must combine the complete information collusion-proof
constraints of Section 6 with individual Bayesian incentive constraints. However, the bank
could also force communication with the third party by asking both pieces of information
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and use collusion-proof extended mechanisms. Then we are back to this section. With a
benevolent third party the two modellings lead to the same results.
Another interesting situation occurs when the sharing of information occurs only with
some probability. Then one can argue that extended mechanisms cannot be used if the
principal wants to be sure to satisfy the individual rationality constraints. But then the
collusion-proof constraints must be written under incomplete information,12 leaving open
the relevance of collusion under complete information with some probability. However,
Grameen Bank will remain in general useful when collusion is an issue despite the fact
that unconditional revelation contracts perform better because of the transaction costs of
collusion due to asymmetric information.
8 Conclusion
We have considered an extremely simple model to make two points. On the one hand, GB
contracts are a particular way of practicing a subtle type of discrimination and constitute
a powerful tool of rent extraction when types are correlated. However, they are not the
optimal such instruments and furthermore they require negative correlation of types to
rationalize payments higher when the partner fails. On the other hand, we have shown
that GB contracts are interesting to extract rents when collusive behavior is possible.
These results should be robust to more general situations with loans of variable sizes,
endogenous grouping. It is obvious for the rst result. It relies on the diculties of
enforcing collusion ex post for the second.
We leave for further research a more detailed analysis of the optimal collusion-proof
contracts when collusion takes places under asymmetric information with limited liability
constraints taking into account in particular in the design of side-contracts.
A necessary next step for the analysis will be to consider dynamic situations. With
full commitment of the bank, the emphasis should be on the opportunities of dynamic
collusion. Without full commitment, we will have to deal with the additional problems of
ratchet eects.
12See Laont and Martimort (1999).
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Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1
Regime 1: Constraints (1), (2), (3), (4) must be satised. (1) and (2) imply P (h  x) =








Substituting these expressions in the bank's expected prot we get:




Since ph r > 0, maximizing with respect to P and P gives P = P = 1, x = x = h  u
p
(i.e. a pooling contract), and an expected prot








Regime 2: The bank oers a loan intended only for type p. It is constrained only by
(4), type p's participation constraint, hence
x = h  
u
p
which leaves no rent to type p and an expected prot
(ph  r   u):
Regime 2 is better than regime 1 if














Appendix 2: Bayesian Incentive and
Participation Constraints








His (Bayesian) participation constraint is:
11
11 + 12




p(h  px12   (1  p)y12)  u
hence (6) and similarly for (7).
His (Bayesian) incentive constraint is
11
11 + 12
p(h  px11   (1   p)y11) +
12
11 + 12




p(h  px21   (1  p)y21) +
12
11 + 12
p(h  px22   (1   p)y22)
hence (8) and similarly for (9).
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Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 2
Equations (12) to (15) can be rewritten:
2
6664
 11  12 0 0
0 0  21  22
 11  11 11 12

































The determinant of this system is  =  2.
Solving the system we obtain:









12(12 + 22) 
p   p
pp













These payments satisfy the limited liability constraint if 12 is close enough to zero.
Then, both entrepreneurs are indierent between lying or telling the truth about their
type and no rent is given up. They are rewarded if their partner is good and punished if
he is bad.
As 12 increases we reach the boundary h for X12.
For example if 11 = 22 =
1
2













(21 + 22) (A.2)
11(h X11)  11(h X21) (A.3)
21(h X21)  21(h X11): (A.4)
From (A.3) (A.4), X11 = X21 = X.
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In the special case this is positive if " is larger than ".
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Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 5
Let us denote x = X11 = X22.



























 X22 = X11
writes now
x  h  (11 + 12)
u
p







 X11 = X22
writes now
x  h  
u
p(11 + 12) + p(21 + 22)
:
These inequalities are compatible if
p2 + p2 + pp
"
(11 + 12)2 + (21 + 22)2   1
(11 + 12)(22 + 21)
#
 0:
But the left hand side equals
p2 + p2   2pp = (p  p)2 > 0 if p > p:
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